There are
several competing definitions for violence. This paper will examine a “legitimist”
definition such as that put forth by Robert Paul Wolff, a “wide” definition
such as that put forth by Johan Galtung, and a “restricted” definition such as
that put forth by C.A.J. Coady. An analysis of these definitions will show ways
in which they are all similar, ways in which they are different, and then conclude
that there no possible definition that does not in some way rely on some
presupposed moral notions through which the term must be defined if it is to be
understood in any way similar to the way it is commonly understood now. Furthermore,
this paper will show how each of the authors apply their own normative moral
judgments to the concept of violence: each seeking to promote a view of
violence that supports what is arguably a conception that agrees with each
author’s particular political bias. However, each author provides valuable
insight into the concept of violence and how it operates within a
socio-political framework. The end result will show how the definition of
violence, assuming compromise between two extreme understandings of the same word
is a virtuous goal, should be one that more resembles the one provided by Newton
Garver. While his definition is also
problematic in some areas, it serves as the most reasonable one overall, most
closely accords with what people believe violence is, and seems to be a workable
midpoint between those presented by Galtung and Coady even if it is somewhat
closer to the wide definition than it is to the restricted.
THE
LEGITIMIST POSITION
Robert Paul
Wolff, in his essay On Violence, opts
to use an operable definition of violence, and states “Strictly speaking, violence is the illegitimate or unauthorized
use of force to effect decisions against the will or desire of others”
(55). His essay is a criticism that violence itself is an inherently confused
term which relies on the notion of there being a legitimate authority. Wolff
denies there is such a thing as legitimate authority, politically (57). This is
unsurprising considering he is an anarchist and claims there is no such thing
as a right of command by the state, and without such a right of command political
violence cannot exist as the illegitimate use of force because state legitimacy
does not exist.
The use of the word
“illegitimate” in his definition is only relevant when considered a
characteristic present when there is such a thing as a political authority: an
authority of the political, defined by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as
“of, belonging to, or concerned with the form, organization, and administration
of a state, and with the regulation of its relations with other states” (“Political”
def.1.a.).
Wolff’s
position is absolutist in terms of moral autonomy. He argues that moral
autonomy and a state having de jure authority
(the right to command and be obeyed) are antithetical to each other. His a priori position that all people have a
duty to exercise full autonomy is such that it denies the existence of any
external de jure authority, at least
insofar as a government is concerned (56). Wolff argues there are four basic
views on violence, depending on one’s position in society and the financial or
political aims present. However, only the first view comes with a definition
and it is the legitimist definition he is arguing against (61-62). The other
views are mere assertions which serve his own interests, which he may feel
justified in doing as he states, “The concept of violence serves as a rhetorical device for
proscribing those political uses of force which one considers inimical to one’s
central interests” (61).
The OED lists twelve entries for defining violence
(“Violence” def.1.a.-6.). None of the entries use legitimacy as a
characteristic of differentiation between applied force that is violent and
applied force that is not violent. Wolff has, in this author’s opinion, put
forward a straw man argument in support of political anarchism by making the
assertion that violence, defined such that legitimacy is a component, is an incoherent
concept. The response to this should be, “That’s nice, but violence is not
defined in this way, so arguing against such a definition is really only a ploy
to serve the author’s rhetorical purpose of promoting anarchism by way of an
absolutist view of personal autonomy which is antithetical to coercive force of
any kind, especially governments; but also includes the force applied through
social opinion.” Wolff knows his
position is likely an exercise in futility as he finds what is necessary to
realize his utopian ideal is highly improbable. What he seeks as an end is an
actualization of the following, which can be found in his book, In Defense of Anarchism:
When rational men, in full knowledge of
the proximate and distant consequences of their actions, determine to set
private interest aside and pursue the general good, it must be possible for
them to create a form of association which accomplishes that end without
depriving some of them of their moral autonomy (78).
THE
WIDE POSITION
Legitimacy is not a concern for Johan Galtung, who
says in his essay Violence, Peace and
Peace Research, “Violence is present when one is being influenced so that
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations”
(80). Galtung came to this definition as the logical conclusion of two asserted
premises:
1. The term ‘peace’ shall be used for social
goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most.
2. The statement peace is absence of violence shall be retained as valid (79).
It is unlikely that the word “retained,”
in the second premise, means anything comparable to “kept and continued to be
used,” as prior to this publication the word peace was rarely, if ever,
commonly defined to be the absence of violence. It is much more likely that the
word means “employed,” which makes this conception of peace either rare, or
unique, at the time of the writing. However, by choosing to make the assertion
that peace is the absence of violence, Galtung is able to create a conception
of peace and violence where each is the logical opposite of the other, being
two sides of the same coin. This is problematic, as Galtung admits when he says
it is clearly an obscurum per obcurius
(defining the obscure through the use of the more obscure), but he also
continues and makes the claim that such an understanding accords with common
understanding: which is arguable because, as has already been stated, his
conception of peace in his essay was either rare or unique at the time of its
publication (79).
While
Galtung’s conception may help in the overall promotion of peace, his definition
of violence is so broad that some may see this view of peace as being
synonymous with perfect justice and violence synonymous with injustice. This interpretation
has some support, as Galtung uses the terms structural violence and social
injustice interchangeably (84). This understanding of violence, like Wolff’s
relies on normative issues relating to justice, and is likely to be, as Wolff
said, another rhetorical device which serves the author’s central
interests. However, a literal
application of Galtung’s definition of violence is also problematic as it will
lead to some very unusual acts being considered violent/unjust, as C.A.J. Coady
identifies in his essay, The Idea of
Violence. For example, a person who gives another a sleeping pill upon
request would be committing an act of violence since the act will result in the
recipient losing some somatic and mental realizations and therefore be below
their potential, at least for a time (249). Such an understanding in this way
is not in accordance with “common understanding.”
THE
RESTRICTED POSITION
J.A.C. Coady, in his essay The Idea of Violence, uses an appeal to authority to support his
argument against both wide and legitimist views of violence. Specifically, he
quotes the OED definition, which he seems to rely on mostly for criticism
against Galtung’s wide definition, “The exercise of physical force so as to
inflict injury on or damage to persons or property; action or conduct
characterized by this” (“Violence” def.1.a.). While the definition provided does serve as a fairly strong
starting point to criticize the expansive definition of violence put forth by
Galtung (as well as Wolff’s due to the lack of reference to legitimacy), either
Coady was being disingenuous with his use of the source, or the source has
changed since the time he quoted it. The OED provides a different definition
than the one Coady used. The correct, or new, definition from the OED is the
same as the one used by Coady except for the ending which, picking up from
within the definition used earlier, adds “treatment or usage tending to cause
bodily injury or forcibly interfering
with personal freedom” (“Violence”
def.1.a.). In Coady’s defense, he
equivocates somewhat by saying of the OED definition that he wants to endorse
something like it, and admits “it faces certain difficulties and requires some
clarification” (247). He points out that the definition relies on an
understanding of force, which an emergency medical responder might use to save
the life of a dying person, and to call such a use of force violence does not
accord with a common understanding. He
attempts to resolve this by positing that there is a need to distinguish
between force and coercion, claiming that, “Violence is, of course, one way of
coercing, but only one,” implying that coercion is a necessary consideration
for determining whether violence is present, though coercion being present does
not, in and of itself, mean that violence is necessarily present (259). He does not make the claim that violence is
ever not coercive, which leaves open the possibility that violence is always
coercive in some way.
Another
consideration left unaddressed by Coady is the idea of whether or not a threat
of force is a de facto use of
force. This author is inclined to
believe that threats, explicit or not, are acts of force. One potential problem with this particular
understanding is whether the threat needs to be intended, or if the perception
of coercion by another is enough to claim the other has used force, though
unintentionally. While Coady did not define force, here is a
workable definition from the OED: “An influence operating on a body so as to
produce an alteration or a tendency to alteration of its state” (“Force”
def.11.a.). This definition of
force would allow for the possibility of violence being done on a subject
strictly through the force of words and their effect (influence) on the
subject. However, Coady’s preference for
a strictly physical understanding of violence would likely cause him to reject
this understanding of force.
THE
COMPROMISE POSITION
Newton Garver, in his essay What Violence Is, explores the etymology of the word violence
before attempting to define it. He says
the word comes from the Latin words ‘vis’ (force) and ‘latus’ (to carry). He then shows how those two words come
together in the present participle ‘violans.’
Another word that comes from this source is ‘violation,’ giving the
sense that the force being carried is to be used to violate something (171). Assuming this is true then violence is the
application of force that violates someone.
To understand the idea of violating a person requires an acceptance of
the idea that people possess rights that are inextricable from their personhood. Garver is “forced to accept natural rights in
order to understand the moral dimensions of violence,” and goes on to assert
that “the most fundamental right a person has is a right to his body.” Garver further claims that in addition to this
fundamental right, there are things apart from one’s body that are necessary to
one’s being. One such thing is “a kind
of dignity or ‘autonomy,’ as Kant put it,” an aspect of which is one’s right to
the product of one’s labor, including the normal consequences of one’s actions
(172). Garver then proceeds to discuss a
typology of violence that centers on whether it is personal or
institutionalized and whether it is overt or covert (173). This typology results in violence being
defined as force directed at a person
which results in a violation of the person (including their property, tangible
and intangible), whether overt, covert, personal, or institutional. Even with this definition there is the same
problem as mentioned previously regarding whether or not the violence needs to
be intentional or not. As stated,
unintentional violence could be nothing more than a less than kind word spoken
to the wrong person, at the wrong time, resulting in that person committing
suicide because of the immense emotional pain they suffered as a result of those
words. While unlikely, the fact is that
from the suicide’s perspective, they were violated. A possible definition of violate that may
mitigate this problem would need to revolve around the idea of harm, damage, or
injury. One thing this particular view
does is ignore whether an act is justified or not, as in the case of capital
punishment and murder respectively, but would require one to determine whether
or not it was the spoken word that did the damage to the suicide victim, or
whether the suicide wrongly perceived a harm that was not truly present and
then harmed themself.
This
conception of violence is substantially broader than Coady’s, and somewhat
narrower than Galtung’s. Garver also
addresses two very important ideas about violence, only one of which was given
any real focus by the other authors discussed.
Like the others, Garver states that violence is inherently a moral
concept, but in his case the moral notion is a result of the idea that violence
is a violation, though the violence may or may not be justifiable or
excusable. Unlike the others, however,
he states that what is clear to him is that there are varying degrees of
violence. Everyone will have a sense of
where a violation will fall along the scale even if they differ greatly in
where the violence should be placed on the scale. This is merely the result of people having
different experiences and different ideas about what is and isn’t a violation and
how bad a particular violation is in relation to other, different
violations. I agree with Garver that “it
is possible to achieve considerable intersubjective agreement about comparisons
of pairs of cases” when judging the relative degrees of those violations (181).
Works
Cited
Oxford English Dictionary. N.p., n.d. Web. 24 Nov.
2013. <http://www.oed.com/>.
