Is
Challenging the Amoralist an Exercise in Futility?
Maybe
Not, but Beating One’s Head against a Brick Wall is Less Painful
In The
Amoralist, Bernard Williams seeks to make the point that even if one only
has limited, and even intermittent, capricious sympathy for others it becomes
possible to include that person into the world of morality because it provides
a starting point for moral considerations.
While this is Williams’ point with The Amoralist, he concludes by
saying “It does not follow from this that having sympathetic concern for others
is a necessary condition of being in the world of morality…It does not follow
from what has so far been said; but it is true.” The
Amoralist is an exploration in how one might be able to convince someone
who has no conscious moral considerations to be moved to consider morality as a
decision making tool. Considerations of
biology, psychology, socialization and cultural inculcation are used by
Williams throughout the piece to probe for openings in the amoralist’s reasoning,
and are used, in turn, by the amoralist to dismiss considerations of
morality. After a close reading it
becomes apparent that the amoralist forces the individuals in the society he is
a part of to look at their own basis for choosing whatever moral code they live
by, and garner a better understanding of where those beliefs come from and then
question those beliefs themselves, perhaps using the amoralist as a tool for
understanding the ramifications of whatever choice they make. The end result of this exploration will
likely be an acceptance of some moral theory, or theories that aren’t
destructively antithetical to each other in a society, that tends to secure and
strengthen the social institutions that make up a society at large.
Williams begins
his characterization of the amoralist by juxtaposing the presumption that the
amoralist is indifferent to moral considerations with the presumption that the
amoralist does have motivations, such as caring about some things, and has some
preferences, aims, and passions for some desired ends. Williams further explains that these ends do
not necessarily exclude an acknowledgement of morality, though in the case of
the amoralist one will hard pressed to get him to admit to such a thing. The amoralist will need to avoid several
potential pitfalls in order to avoid moral considerations. The pitfalls initially listed by Williams
are, “caring about other people’s interests, having an inclination to tell the
truth or keep promises if it does not suit him to do so, being disposed to
reject courses of action on the ground that they are unfair or dishonorable or
selfish.” Caring about other’s interests
would tend to lead to moral territory as it can cause action to be judged on
the basis of what is right, fair, or even obligatory depending on the
relationship, the circumstances, and the considerations made prior to any
action. Having an inclination for truth
telling and keeping promises tends toward moral territory in the same way, and
in order to avoid moral considerations there cannot be a preference for either
of these as that preference, or inclination,
implies a preconceived rule for behavior regardless of the circumstances
involved. To reject courses of action
based on a belief that they are unfair, dishonorable, or selfish would move the
amoralist fully into the realm of moral consideration as such beliefs are, by
definition, the result of personal, moral value judgments.
Further, according
to Williams, the amoralist needs to not be disposed toward thoughts that some
actions are ‘all right’ as these dispositions imply there are actions that are
not ‘all right,’ and would lead to a comparison of what it is that makes an act
either ‘all right’ or not ‘all right,’ or perhaps even ‘all wrong,’ again
requiring a moral value judgment.
Williams leaves the amoralist a way out of this particular dilemma by
allowing the amoralist to define acts that are termed ‘all right’ as acts that
he is not going to moralize about. Of
course, if it is assumed that the amoralist in question is truly an amoralist
then he would not be moralizing about anything at all, would he? Also, Williams rightly notes that the
amoralist must avoid consistent resentment and disapproval of people treating
him in the same manner he treats them.
Not liking such treatment, and even fighting back, is acceptable as
those reactions do not necessitate moral considerations, but resentment and
disapproval are attitudes that generally result from moral considerations, and
the more consistent the attitudes are the more likely it is that they stem from
some moral precept. It seems obvious,
but Williams goes on to explain that the amoralist must avoid considering
himself, or anyone else, as courageous, splendid, or excellent. Each of these beliefs could put the amoralist
firmly in the field of moral value judgments, as they are each representative
of a kind of virtue and reflect an absence of vice as their opposing terms
would show. In this case, if one is the
opposite of courageous, he is cowardly; the opposite of splendid, unremarkable;
the opposite of excellent, inferior. For
the amoralist to use descriptive terms like these, with a common understanding
of the meanings, it would show that he may have embraced the belief that some
characteristics are better than others.
This is true unless the amoralist is merely identifying certain
characteristics and applying the appropriate term based on what he knows or
believes everyone else thinks, applying no value to the terms himself but
acknowledging that others do. It seems
possible that the amoralist might be able to consider himself to be virtuous by
others’ definitions based on the characteristics he’s shown them, or know
they’ve seen from him, yet not care one whit about virtue or vice, and again
refrain from moralizing about it or paying much attention to it at all.
According to
Williams, the amoralist who thinks of himself as courageous will result in a
false conclusion, “that the more moral citizens would be amoral if they could
get away with it, or if they were not too frightened, or if they were not
passively conditioned by society-if, in general, they did not suffer from
inhibitions.” Perhaps Williams sees his
assertion here as self-evident. Perhaps
the falsity of the amoralist’s conclusion is not self-evident, but Williams
think that an explanation is irrelevant or unimportant for the purposes of his
discussion. Regardless of how Williams
reaches this conclusion, this author sees the amoralist’s claim as possibly
true, but unlikely, and that if there were a change in moral behavior by
removing these inhibitions, it would tend to shift toward egoism and not
amoralism.
The discussion
regarding a likely source of people’s motivations, while relevant to
understanding how it might be possible to move the amoralist to an honest consideration
of moral reasoning, provides evidence that the amoralist might well be
incapable of such considerations, and not just unwilling. The amoralist reasons that behavior is merely
the result of biological predispositions and social conditioning, which, if
taken to its logical end is an argument over the origins of morality, and if
the amoralist has reasoned correctly, any belief in morality is nothing more
than a programmed belief. This would
allow the amoralist to continue to refuse to moralize about things, but would
require him to admit that it is possible some stimuli might eventually cause a
reaction in him that moves him from amoralism to morality of some type.
Williams seems to
have a particularly strong desire to have the amoralist use reason to move away
from his current belief system, and while I’m sure he understands that reason
and emotion are two discrete influences even though they interact with each
other, it isn’t until near the end of the piece that Williams is willing to
move away from the focus on reason and toward a stronger focus on the drives
caused through emotion; specifically by refocusing on the amoralist’s capacity
for sympathy toward others, and being moved to act by that sympathy. Unfortunately, if the amoralist is going to
maintain consistency, instead of an exploration of actions caused by emotions
in the hopes that such an exploration might lead to the amoralist providing
reasons or justifications that open to door for moral considerations, Williams
approach is likely to be stymied again by the amoralist dismissing the entire
cause and effect chain reaction as having absolutely nothing to do with
morality, and everything to do with biology and the social conditioning (the
sum of all stimuli up to that point in time) Williams allowed for earlier. In this way the amoralist is able to, thanks
to Williams’ help, erect and perpetually maintain a nearly impenetrable
obstacle keeping the amoralist firmly justified, and perhaps even factually
right, in his amoralistic beliefs. It is
obvious here that Williams believes an answer can be found in sympathy, but in
this piece he did not make his case, even stating (as mentioned earlier), “It
does not follow from this that having sympathetic concern for others is a
necessary condition of being in the world of morality…but it is true.”
