Plato & Aristotle:
Pro & Con Arguments on Selected
Topics
Foundational Material:
Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics
Aristotle Politics
The Laws of Plato
Bob Huddleston
POLS 3401
Dr. J.H. Lomax
28 April 2013
“Mankind must have laws, and conform to
them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast. And the
reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is best for human
society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best. In the first
place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is
concerned, not with private but with public good (for public good binds
together states, but private only distracts them); and that both the public and
private good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and
not the individual is first considered. In the second place, although a person
knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and
irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in
regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as
secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and
selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will
bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working
darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city.
For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the
truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or
order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the
subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true
and free, and in harmony with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere,
or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are
second best. These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are
unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I have.” -
Plato
Aristotle’s mentor, Plato, is credited with writing the
Laws late in his life. While his
earlier exposition, The Republic, is the intellectual attempt to
determine the ideal city, which includes a refined characterization of both the
citizenry and the system of government, the Laws is a more practical
exploration, taking into account the limitations of the individuals who inevitably
will make up the whole of the city.
Plato’s protégé, Aristotle, expanded, refined, and reordered the ideas
espoused by both Plato and Socrates to develop the Nicomachean Ethics
and Politics. The following
exposition is an attempt at tying together the various thoughts of the three
later works just mentioned and crafting a series of arguments supporting or
opposing some selected policies in relation to governance. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics will be
used as the foundation for all of the arguments as this text provides the most
refined version of what it means for a person to live the good life, as well as
the implied role a government should play in human life. The Ethics will also be revisited at
the end to address ways in which the arguments presented can be seen as being
either in accord with virtue ethics, or not.
Aristotle’s Politics and The Laws of Plato will supplement
the ethical foundations and will provide the bulk of the material used to craft
the arguments being posited. The last
section will be a short exploration into the role Aristotelian virtue ethics
plays in the relationship between government and citizen.
The
arguments presented, in order, are as follows:
1) Against
Slavery
2) Against
Communism
3) Against
Economic Wealth and Commercial Enterprise
4) For
& Against – Rulers and the Laws as Moral Educators
5) For
& Against Laws Punishing Impiety
6) For
& Against Equality of the Sexes in Family, Military and Government
7) For
& Against Kingship
8) For
& Against Democracy
9) For
& Against Mixed Regimes
10) For &
Against Divided Powers
Against
Slavery
In
Plato’s Laws the Athenian stranger tells of several seven different
natural occurrences of the rulers and the ruled.[i] One of these
instances is that of the master over the slave,[ii] though his point in this section is that the most
proper of the seven is the prudent over the ignorant.[iii] The
stranger’s preference is explained as being the most natural and is
characterized as, “the natural rule exercised by the law over willing subjects,
without violence.”[iv] Assuming the
Athenian stranger truly believes what he says about the rule of the prudent
over the ignorant it is impossible to justify slavery, at least in cases where
the slaves are unwilling participants in their own bondage, as well as in cases
where masters commit violence upon their slaves. That the institution of slavery was
widespread and contemporaneous with the text may serve as an explanation for
why Plato may not have wanted to draw too much attention to the idea that he
believed those who supported the institution were dismissing the rule of the
prudent over the ignorant in favor of the strong over the weak, and did so
strictly for personal gain.
In
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics slavery to a master is compared to being
a child to a father and it is claimed that in both of these relationships there
is no such thing as injustice in the political sense. However, Aristotle makes the assertion that
possessions such as one’s children and slaves are a part of oneself, and
“nobody chooses to harm himself.”[v] That the
qualifier of “in a political sense” was used is important, considering
Aristotle, at the end of book five, states “there does in fact seem to be injustice
in relation to oneself, because…it is possible to suffer something contrary to
their particular longings. Just as for
ruler and ruled, then, there seems to be something just in relation to each
other.”[vi] This seeming
endorsement of slavery with the claim it is not an injustice in the political
sense appears to be rectified by Aristotle in book one of his Politics. While it may be argued that Aristotle is
making an argument for the justification of slavery, it seems more reasonable
that his argument is against slavery as it was commonly practiced, and makes
the care of a “natural slave” more of a costly duty than a benefit to its
master.
In chapter six of book
one Aristotle draws a clear distinction between those who are enslaved by force
or law and those who are natural slaves.
The former are present through an appeal to the idea that might makes
right, while the latter is an acknowledgement that there are those people who
are so deficient in the mental capacities that they are unable to care for themselves. While these may be termed natural slaves, it
seems clear that the necessities of care, and the exercise of prudence and
justice to oneself, as addressed earlier, make the masters of such slaves,
whether an individual or the city, more paternalistic caregivers responsible
for the slaves’ well-being and care as wards than traditional masters directing
what would otherwise be an equal in a different environment. Note fifty-six in chapter seven makes clear
what appears to be at the heart of Aristotle’s delicately put position on
slavery. “By the very argument that
justifies slavery as natural, any slavery not based on the defect of the
intellectual capacity described at 1254b 22-23 is disadvantageous to the master
as well as to the slave, and a source of mutual hostility or hatred.”[vii] By tying the
various texts together in this way it appears that justice would require the
abolition of slavery as it concerns those enslaved through force or law. Assuming this is the case and the coercive
force of law is impermissible to justify slavery, then those natural slaves can
be no more than wards of the state, either directly or through individuals who
are regulated in their behavior as surrogates for the state toward the slaves in
their charge. This interpretation could
also reasonably be said to be congruous with the virtues of liberality or
magnificence, and gentleness, in addition to justice as explained earlier.
Against
Communism
The
Laws make it clear that not all things should be held in common by the
citizens, though a point is made that if such a thing could exist in a way that
all were virtuous and homogenous in their beliefs, it would have to be a city
“inhabited, presumably, by gods or children of gods (more than one), and they
dwell in gladness, leading such a life.”[viii] Plato does,
however assert that property should be allotted equally to the citizens and
that each “must consider his share to be at the same time the common property
of the whole city, and must cherish his land, as a part of the fatherland...”[ix] Furthermore,
without addressing people as property held in common, Plato does make it clear
that population control is so important that the legislators and the elders
will need to work to make sure that women and men are brought together in some
way so as to make sure the population remains at a steady level, with families
having more children than they *should* have being persuaded or coerced into
having their children sent into households where there are too few children.[x]
Aristotle
makes a very strong argument against many things being held in common when he
states “what is common to the most people gets the least attention,” and
“People are concerned most about the things that are particularly theirs, and
less so about things held in common…they slight them more on the assumption
that someone else is taking care of them.”[xi] In addition
to this, as a direct response to Socrates’ position that the ideal city is one
that has become one with the people and the people have become one with the
city, seemingly based on a mutual affection between all, Aristotle identifies a
similar problem. “In the city affection
would necessarily be watered down by this sort of association.”[xii] He goes on
to explain that “there are two things which most of all make human beings feel
care and affection, something that is one’s own and something that is one’s
favorite, neither of which can be present for people governed this way.”[xiii] If one
accepts Aristotle’s reasoning that only those two things make people feel care
and affection, and accepts the reasoning that care and affection are important
for people to feel toward each other and their city, then it must follow that
communism, at least regarding women and children, and perhaps other properties
generally, is a bad form of governance and that many things should not be held
in common. For land, and other things
held in common, unequal production and inequalities in the efforts applied or
pleasures acquired are likely to result in conflict and bring to the forefront
questions of justice; human selfishness being mostly to blame.[xiv]
Against
Economic Wealth and Commercial Enterprise
The
argument here is one that seeks to limit the effects of luxury and the results
of wealth inequalities. In the first
case, an excess of luxury is likely to make leading a virtuous life more
difficult. In the second, wealth
inequalities inspire jealousies and can lead to those with more wealth
exercising greater political power for their own benefit, increasing wealth
inequalities, risking civil unrest or even civil war. The Athenian stranger argues the lawmaker
must control poverty and excess wealth.[xv] The lawgiver
must set a minimum amount permissible to avoid impoverishment within the
citizenry and limit the wealth to “up to four times again” the amount of the
initial allotment of land. The purpose
of such laws is to avoid conditions that “breed both civil war and faction.”[xvi] The Athenian
stranger further makes the claim in book nine that “money has the power to
engender tens of thousands of erotic desires for its insatiable and limitless
acquisition.”[xvii] The claim
stems from the prior claim that voluntary and unjust actions tend to “spring
from weakness in the face of pleasures, desires, and envies,” which the Cretan
Kleinias agrees with[xviii], and explains assertions from books one and
five. In book one, the claim is made
that there are both divine and human, or lesser, goods, and the human goods
include health, beauty, strength, and wealth, in that order.[xix] The same is
reiterated in book five where the stranger points again at the primacy the
divine goods should be given in ordering what should be honored.[xx]
Such
a limitation on excesses of poverty and wealth seems tailored to serving a
twofold purpose. On one hand, as was
previously mentioned, by limiting the amount of inequality within the city it
inhibits the ardor that would make civil strife and civil war either
problematic or the source of the city’s demise.
Furthermore, it serves as both an education toward the virtue of
temperance, focusing the citizens less on wealth acquisition, since beyond a
certain point the wealth goes straight to the city without benefiting the
citizen, and more toward the more noble virtues of the soul and character. However, even if one assumes the policy would
fail to instill any sense of virtue, it is obvious that the limitations on both
sides serve as a form of behavioral modification where individuals are, by law,
forced into a situation in which their options from wealth are not
substantially greater or lesser than any other citizen’s options, balancing the
amount of power that can be wielded through wealth. Therefore, while a citizen may not be very
virtuous, at least their behavior is heavily constrained so that it is more
likely to be little more than a functional substitute for the sake of social
order and cohesion.
For
& Against – Rulers and the Laws as Moral Educators
Aristotle
claims “Things productive of the whole of virtue are all those legislative acts
pertaining to the education to the common [good].”[xxi]
This sentiment was an echo of the Athenian stranger’s instruction in
book one of the Laws. The
stranger places in order the divine and human goods, as were previously
mentioned in the section on wealth, so as to guide the legislator in proper
prioritization of the laws. The
legislator is charged with caring for the citizens in various ways, paying
attention to their pains and pleasures, their longings and their passions,
“blaming and praising correctly by means
of the laws themselves.”[xxii]
A full reading of this section on what should be watched and how the
laws should honor or dishonor citizens in accordance with the degree to which
they have earned the honors or dishonors appears to provide a basic framework
for the rulers and the laws to serve not merely as moral educators, but to
exercise paternalistic force over the citizens from before birth to after
death; the proverbial cradle-to-grave oversight and ordering by laws.
Aristotle
seems to back away from this position somewhat in book two of his Politics
when he criticizes Socrates for trying to make the household and the city one
in all ways when they should only be made one in certain ways. While Aristotle asserts “one ought to make it
[the city] communal and one through education,” he goes on to claim Socrates’
approach through regulation was ill-conceived.
Aristotle continues and claims that it is better to address moral
education informally through a combination of customs, philosophy, and laws or
regulations.[xxiii]
By placing a greater emphasis on the role of customs, which will also
include the educations received in all of the various households that will be
different from each other to varying degrees, Aristotle shows he understands
there are limits to the legislator’s ability to fully control moral
education. Furthermore, with the lack of
total control over education, and the likelihood that any regulation may run
counter to any household customs, this knowledge if used prudently will tend to
moderate the good legislator, which in turn would make for more moderate laws
regarding education.
However
successful the legislator is at educating the citizens in moral virtue, one might
be left wondering how this could be a bad thing. In cases where the laws are brought into
force in opposition to the citizens, the answer is obvious. They would lose respect for the laws and only
follow them under threat of harsh penalties.
The laws, the legislators, and the penalties in this case would foment
resentment and risk civil war or revolution, possibly resulting in the city’s
collapse. If the laws were such that
they benefited the rulers at the expense of the ruled, even if the citizens
were kept ignorant of the injustice, the moral education would, by definition
not be promoting moral virtue, just mere willing obedience. One other problem with moral education being
the purview of the law is the fact that what is being dealt with is a fairly
complex and nuanced virtue ethic that, as discussed in class, would take an
extremely discerning person to even identify the presence of true virtue as
opposed to simple behavioral modification through habituation. If the two are indistinguishable in large
part, what happens when, through cunning, a charismatic interloper hijacks
morality and convinces the hoi polloi that virtue is merely whatever he claims
it to be? In short, a policy for moral
education in the city is dangerous as it is possible the education be twisted
toward the purposes of those in power and do damage to the common good of the
citizenry. Leaning heavily on tradition
and customs, a tyrannical despot may be able to exert enough force through
persuasion to create new customs that over time will be make controlling the
subjects easier.
For
& Against Laws Punishing Impiety
Plato’s
Laws incorporates what seems to be a strong defense of religion being an
integral part of the governance of a city, used in large part to bind the
community together and make the citizens and the city one in relation to what
is seen as pious and righteous and what is seen as their opposites. Laws regarding aspects of piety are promoted
in relation to matrimony and procreation, as well as fidelity between the
partners, where what is seen as impious behavior is punished. Punishment for impious behavior is also
legislated regarding the approved types of worship, wrong beliefs regarding the
existence and character of the gods, sexual relations outside of marriage, and
other infractions which are seen to exhibit any disrespect of the gods or what
it is alleged to go against the wishes of the gods. However, Aristotle’s Politics at one
point provides advice to the tyrant on how to use piety and religion to
strengthen his hold on his subjects and keep them somewhat mollified and
unwilling to revolt, making the counter argument that however good
incorporating religion into the laws may seem, the downside is that religion is
a powerful weapon and in order to keep it away from tyrants it may be best if
piety and religion are kept out of the realm of the legislators as much as is
prudent.
The
Athenian stranger makes the claim in book four of the Laws that the
“noblest and truest of all principles” is “for the good man it is very noble,
very good, and most efficacious for a happy life…if he sacrifices to and always
communes with the gods—through prayers, votive offerings, and every sort of
service to the gods. But for the bad man
just the opposite of these things holds by nature.”[xxiv]
This quote appears to lay the foundation for all of the laws to
follow. The first of the laws addressed
deal with the impiety of a man refusing to take a wife and start a family. Disobeying the laws designed to persuade a
man to marry results in fines and being deprived of honors, “For anyone voluntarily
to deprive himself of this is never pious.”[xxv]
For refusing to be excluded from worship festivities for refusal to
honor the gods appropriately the law would allow anyone offended to bring suit
against the impious lawbreaker.[xxvi]
By molding public opinion to hold in esteem noble characteristics of the
soul, a love of honor and a reverence for the gods, and creating an environment
where it is believed that any sexual relations not between man and wife are
impious and offensive to the gods as well as a failure, or loss, of one’s
self-control to the pleasures of the body, which is dishonorable, yet again the
specter of religion is used to persuade, coerce, and control the citizens,
guiding them toward moral virtue as espoused by the Athenian stranger.[xxvii]
The most grievous act of impiety deals with one’s beliefs regarding the
existence, or nature, of the gods. For
denying the existence of the gods or for believing the gods are anything but
just, the penalties range from five years imprisonment to death, with the
requirement that release requires a proper belief in the gods and their nature.[xxviii]
A
problem with laws regarding piety is discussed by Aristotle in book five of his
Politics. Reminiscent of a
Machiavellian illustration of the difference between the way one is and the way
one seems, Aristotle’s paints the same picture when he asserts “he must always
make a display of taking matters related to the gods exceptionally
seriously. For people…are less likely to
plot against those they think have even the gods as allies.”[xxix]
Showing here how involving the gods into laws could be used by a tyrant,
it seems reasonable to assume that the same strategy could be used by
democracies and oligarchies as well to secure the self-interested desires of
the rulers. One other consideration that
implies there might have been serious misgivings about involving religious
matters in the law, though maybe weak, is the Athenian stranger’s opening
conversation in Plato’s Laws. By
opening with the question of whether or not the laws originate from the gods or
from men, knowingly or not he has cast a shadow on any lawgivers who would
claim either divine revelation to justify the laws or that the laws are rightly
ordered regarding what is commanded or restricted as they relate to the gods.[xxx]
Combine this question with the discussion of the compromises that would
be necessary when different clans come together to form a city, each having
different traditions and different beliefs regarding the gods, and it seems to
further imply that only those laws which meet the bare minimums regarding
religion would and should be considered, and then only if they are universal in
belief, or at least nearly so.[xxxi]
For
& Against Equality of the Sexes in the Family, the Military and the Government
Plato and Aristotle seem somewhat
ambivalent toward women. On the one hand
women are capable of intelligence, prudence, and the moral virtues. On the other hand they are essentially weak
flatterers and the cause of men seeking the vice of carnal pleasures over more
honorable pursuits. While Plato may
have set up his ideal city in the Republic so that women were, at least
in the highest class of people, granted equal treatment, and while Aristotle
implies that women in the household are the equals of their husbands when he
draws a parallel between a man’s apparent sovereignty in the home to the
elevation of a mere foot-pan to something divine[xxxii], women are characterized with an
essential nature that makes it clear that both philosophers thought women were
either inherently less than men or were so different from men that to treat
them equally would be an injustice to the natural order of things. Aristotle even claims that “in most instances
of political rule there is an interchange among those who rule and are ruled,
since they tend by nature to be on equality and have no difference” and that
“the male is always related to the female in this manner.”[xxxiii]
Comparing what Aristotle says here about the equality of men and women
in political rule to some of the more insulting characterizations of women in
all three of the primary texts, reconciliation is difficult if not
impossible. If one assumes that men and
women are on a level of equality regarding political rule, and the best
political life is led by one capable of living a virtuous contemplative life,
it means that women are equal to men when it comes to each and every one of the
intellectual and moral virtues required to live the virtuous contemplative
life. Plato’s stranger in the Laws
does advocate for women to have a role more equal to the men than social
conventions of the time permitted, including similar educations and service in
the military, while still appearing wistful of the city where he believes the
laws are best and women are held in common by the men at one point.[xxxiv]
Regardless
of the degree with which women are granted equality somewhat comparable to men,
such as being allowed to enter government office and serve in the military, the
disparity between the ages of service and the ages at which both men and women
would be permitted to marry can easily lead one to believe the role of women,
outside of procreation, is essentially complementary in nature and not
supplementary.[xxxv]
The complementary role granted in some parts of the texts in no way
counters the way women’s nature is described and may be used to argue that the
appeals to equality were disingenuous.
For example, in the Politics, Aristotle claims “slaves and women
do not get into plots against tyrants.”
In the same section he claims that under tyranny and the last stages of
democracy it happens that the females take control of the households “to get
them to denounce their husbands.”[xxxvi]
Does Aristotle make this claim because there is something inherent in
women that make them more likely for them to deny their spouse than the other
way around? Or is it less about women’s
inherent nature and more about the pervasive nature of unwritten laws and
conventions that kept women in a more subservient role to men, generally? The two options are not entirely mutually
exclusive. It may be there is some
inherent difference of temperaments in combination with the results of a
decidedly patriarchal culture that lead to women being seen and treated as in
many ways less than men.
One
concern with the apparent discrepancy between Aristotle’s characterizations of
women in several areas of the text, comparable to the one just given as an
example, is that when they are juxtaposed with what Plato apparently sees as
the ideal city, and Aristotle’s own claim that, when it comes to the virtues,
men and women are on equal footing, the only possible excuse for presenting
anything less than a purely egalitarian political order where men and women are
concerned, is because of the patriarchal nature of the society. This would tend to make it appear that both
philosophers were either too afraid to challenge more openly the
“might-makes-right” justification of the social order as it was in favor of
pure prudence over ignorance, or that they both held at a minimum some
subconscious belief that women really were inferior to men in general in some
undefined way beyond mere differences in physical strength. An argument could be made for any number of
positions on this topic. But even if it
could ever be determined that the social conventions were too strongly held to
be safely criticized by the writers, then an argument could be made that doing
what they did was to some degree courageous, in accordance with the virtue of
prudence, showed temperance, and was based in part on their knowledge of what
happened to Socrates when he challenged the social norms during his lifetime.
For
& Against Kingship
There
are three different forms of governance that when acting on the behalf of the
common good are the better styles,
and when acting on the behalf of those ruling are the worse styles. The forms are differentiated by the number of
people in power over the city. There is
the rule of one, the rule of a few, and the rule of many. The rule of one, when acting for the common
good is a kingship, and when acting out of self interest is a tyranny. The rule of few is called an aristocracy and
an oligarchy, while the rule of many is called a polity (or at times a timocracy,
or mixed regime) and a democracy, respectively.
These six types of city administrations, as the Athenian stranger refers
to them, may exercise a despotic sort of power within a regime, which is an
admixture of some of the various administrations in either a loose or tight but
unified government over citizens and subjects.[xxxvii]
The
Athenian stranger, speaking for a lawgiver asked what sort of city he should be
given, exhorts, “Give me a tyrannized city,” a tyrant who is young, with a good
memory, who is a capable learner possessed of all the virtues and the natural
inclination to moderation and self restraint.[xxxviii] Having such
a kingship would best enable the new city being discussed to quickly,
efficiently be structured with the type of regime best suited to providing the
citizens with the greatest happiness.
When questioned about how a ruler exercising what appears to them to be
too great a force of persuasion and violence could get the populace to follow
willingly, the response is that there will never be “a quicker or easier way
for a city to change its laws than through the hegemony of all-powerful
rulers.” Furthermore, given the characterization
of the ruler called for, the result would be that more people would aspire to
become like the ruler and as a result, virtue would flourish in the citizens.[xxxix]
Later, however, the Athenian discusses a golden-age
long past when Kronos ruled and set up various kingships of divine beings
called demons where the laws were good and just, and life was peaceful and
happy. This was done because, as the
Athenian said, “Kronos understood that…human nature is not at all capable of
regulating human things…without becoming swollen with insolence and injustice.”[xl] By telling
this story the stranger makes it clear that a just tyrant is only an ideal and
unattainable by mere mortals, so some other order of governance must be found. One characteristic of the force exerted by
the tyrants examined in this section will allegedly lead to the downfall of any
city. The force used was above and
sovereign over the laws when the ideal would be that the laws should be
sovereign over the rulers, serving as a check against despotic tyrannies,
oligarchies, and democracies.[xli] Even if one
were to argue that this description of human nature is in error, the fact
remains that a tyrant, king or despot, who is sovereign over the laws is
problematic. A tyrant without an heir or
with a weak heir, or during times of illness or old age, or after death, leaves
the city to the whims of the powerful and cunning who are victorious in
attaining the power once held by the previous tyrant, and the city will be
re-ordered to suit the new powers.[xlii]
For
& Against Democracy
The best argument for a
pure democracy seems to come from the Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This section on the role of friendship to
virtue shows how different types of friendship relate to different types of
households and types of governance. The
household where there is no master, or at least a very weak one, is likened to
a democracy. In this condition
friendship is said to flourish the most as “those who are equal have many
things in common.”[xliii] Aristotle,
in his Politics, also compares the benefits of citizenship within the
various forms of government and concludes that a citizen is more of a citizen
in a democracy than in any other regime.[xliv] In addition
to this, if the goal is to most closely achieve through laws what the will of
the people is, a democracy seems to be the best candidate, regardless of the
fact that what the people want may have nothing to do with virtue. In order to address the problem of the rule
of the hoi polloi, driven by self-interest, and make a democracy more virtuous
Aristotle hints at a form of democracy where the laws are sovereign over the
citizens, though he does not delve into the particulars for how such a thing
could come into being. But a semantic
loophole may exist if the democracies in which the laws are not sovereign over
the ruling offices are not really democracies at all, but are more akin to
despotic tyrannies, as Aristotle claimed.[xlv] This
reiterates what Plato said earlier regarding the importance of laws being
superior to the rulers, and that the laws are necessary to prevent, or at least
minimize the likelihood of, any regime becoming despotic in its decrees and
administration.
Aristotle thinks
democracy is not the best form of governance possible in the practical sense,
and this seems to be the best argument possible against it. In book four of the Politics he makes an
argument for what he calls constitutional rule, claiming it is better than both
democracy and oligarchy. Constitutional
rule is a mixture of equal parts oligarchy and democracy. The example of a well constituted regime of
this type is such that it is possible to refer to it as either an oligarchy or
a democracy “because they are so beautifully mixed that people who speak that
way are led to do so.”[xlvi] He later
explains that a city is intended for people who are alike in many ways, and
that an important division for the sake of acquiring the mean in governance is
the division of wealth. Those with
excessive wealth and those with little wealth surround the mean being sought as
the best place to be so long as the middle group is large, especially if it is
also more powerful than the groups on either side of it.[xlvii]
For
& Against Mixed Regimes
It seems ludicrous to
say that there is a good, or even a best, argument against a mixed regime if
one assumes a mixed regime is the rule of the many with an eye toward the
common good, and the good is happiness from living a virtuous life. The people, citizens and subjects alike,
would be educated rightly, habituated properly, and given appropriate honors at
the right times and for the right reasons.
The people in this democracy would tend to justly sever those who are
not capable of seeing the rightness of virtue and act in opposition to virtue
from the society either through imprisonment, banishment, or death. This would create a homogonous people,
like-minded enough to be similar to family, with the same or similar traditions
and folkways. Even if the sovereign laws
and the rulers within a mixed regime of this sort fail to create citizens who
are in all ways virtuous, they would succeed in creating a commodious society
where the behavior of those who are not virtuous would be indistinguishable
from those who are authoritatively virtuous.
At least it seemed ludicrous to say there is no best argument against a
mixed regime.
The argument against
the mixed regime presented above is the same argument used against Plato’s
idealized city in the Republic, and it is the same argument used against
any practically unattainable utopian dream where people are as they were
depicted above. The practical problems
of a mixed regime are little different than those suffered by any pure regime,
or administration as Plato called them.
People seek gain. People seek
pleasure. People seek power over
others. These mixed regimes where there
are some aspects of each type of rule – the one, the few, and the many – still
need laws, regulations, policies in place that serve to moderate the
conflicting desires of not only the individuals in the city but the factions
they will inevitably create through the various forms of friendship. The argument is for the rule of law over all
other forms of rule, but with an eye toward the common good regardless of the
specific form a regime takes. While it
might be possible for a city to start small and grow in accordance with the
laws and customs designed for their happiness, it seems unlikely that such a
condition would be able to continue indefinitely. Even the idea of culling the society of the
non-virtuous through imprisonment, banishment, or death, can be argued to be
the result of an unjust application of force, especially by those in opposition
to the normative beliefs the punishments are based on. The other side of that argument is obviously
based in a normative morality that states those being punished are being
rehabilitated or habituated toward virtue, or separated from the society in the
most just way possible to minimize the threat the “criminal” poses to the life
of the people in the city. This sort of
response could indicate an affinity for some form of totalitarian fascism. The people, having no trust in the laws and
in their rulers, and those who would seek power through demagoguery, could
generate ideas of conspiracy. In this
environment, how could one know with any certainty of the rightness of the
actions of those in positions of rulership?
It might be that the rulers have identified threats to their positions
of authority and are merely following the advice of Periander to Thrasybulus
and cutting down those who stand out within the citizenry.[xlviii]
For
& Against Divided Powers
A virtuous king of a well ordered city may act
quickly to take care of the people. A
group of truly virtuous oligarchs of the same city could do just almost as well
as the king, being hindered only in the necessity of coming together to affirm
agreement on the matter at hand.
Likewise, a citizenry with the same characteristics would do less well
than the oligarchs for the same reason, and the larger the population of
citizens the greater the delay would be.
Efficiency is the best argument against divided powers, though it does
not speak to what the desired role government should play, especially in
relation to the virtues and the citizens.
When one considers and gives at least some credence to the warning from
Kronos’ understanding that, “human nature is not at all capable of regulating
human things…without becoming swollen with insolence and injustice,” the
importance of dividing and balancing the various powers in a city becomes
self-evident.
Ethics
Aristotle asserts happiness is an intrinsic good which
people aim at for itself and not for another end. He further asserts the
function of a person is “an activity of soul in accord with reason, or not
without reason,” and, “the human good becomes an activity of the soul in accord
with virtue, and if there are several virtues, then in accord with the best and
most complete one.”[xlix] The
subjective nature of this idea is reflected well in the previous sections
regarding slavery and the role of women.
The issue of subjectivity is even somewhat problematic when applying the
Aristotle’s Ethics to the political world.
The better persons are those who are the most
virtuous, and should, in the interest of justice, be accorded honors in
proportion to their virtue. Virtue is
learned through habituation and education.
One can be assisted or hindered by natural inclinations toward or away
from moderation and self-control.
Differences in inherent characteristics and differences in the way one
is habituated and educated to virtue will play a role, large or small, in the
honors one will earn, whether given or not.
Those who have either difficult or untamable natures affecting virtue
will be perceived by those around them to be less virtuous than others who are
naturally gifted with moderate temperament, all other things being equal, even
if the one with the more difficult nature is more authoritative in their
attempts to fight their inclinations against self-control and their irrational passions
of the soul. There are some natural
talents that can more easily be seen by onlookers and used to properly judge
the degree of virtue exhibited. As an
example of this, a courageous act of martial skills would likely be a grander
spectacle to witness when performed by the well trained and strong soldier than
what would be seen when the same degree of courage is exhibited by a
prepubescent, untrained child. The
visible and properly intuited differences are much more readily seen in this
case than are those differences in inclinations of the soul, as Aristotle would
put it. The result here is that there
will likely be at least some who may attempt virtue, but are operating from
such a disadvantage through nature and circumstance, that honors would be
unjustly denied them due to the failures of perception and knowledge on the
part of those who should be granting the honors. The good thing about the Ethics is
that the virtuous person will realize this is what is happening, pat themselves
on the back for a job well done and be pleased they did the right thing
regardless of the injustice of not receiving appropriate honors.
More problematic is the need for homogeneity within
a city or other political jurisdiction.
The Ethics only works for those who are separate from all other people
or within those communities that agree with the precepts of virtue
presented. A community of Benthamites
would likely believe wallowing in hedonistic pleasures to be more virtuous than
refraining, and a community of Muslims would likely believe that
drinking wine is evidence of vice or sin, and lacking in virtue. In a widely diverse community of beliefs
virtue ethics seems to fare as well as many other belief systems trying to
address ethical rules. Both Plato and Aristotle
knew normative beliefs of what is and is not moral or virtuous would be
problematic, especially when one set of beliefs is mutually exclusive to
another. It was noted, but then glossed
over by Plato in book three of the Laws when a simple selection of lawgivers
presented to the chiefs were presumed to, perhaps magically, make these
differences in beliefs capable of coexisting peacefully when this is not
necessarily always possible, regardless of the good intentions of the people
and their rulers.[l] Even
granting there is an intuitive draw toward Aristotle’s accounting of what it
means to be human, and that reason, prudence, and intelligence are all
necessary and right for people to live in accordance with, and that the account
is aspirational, there is still a subjectivity problem. Politically, it has already been shown how
involving the gods and religion might affect those who do not adhere to the
same beliefs; prison, banishment, or death.
Anything else believed to be as sacred or divine and godly, as virtue is
portrayed, is likely to conflict with other core beliefs involving anything
seen as godlike and sacred. The texts
provide no answer to these particular issues, other than an appeal to prudence
when the authors knew that one man’s prudence is another man’s failed attempt to reason rightly.
[i]
The Laws of Plato. Book 3. 690a -690c. Page 74.
[ii] Ibid. 690b.
[iii] Ibid.
[iv] Ibid. 690c.
[v]
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 5. Chapter 6. 1134b8-12. Page 104.
[vi] Ibid. Chapter 11. 1138b11-13. Page 114.
[vii]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 1. Chapter 6. Note 56. Page 12.
[viii]
The Laws of Plato. Book 5. 739e1. Page 126.
[ix] Ibid. 740a. Page 127.
[x] Ibid. 740b-d. Page 127.
[xi]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 2. Chapter 3. 1261b35. Page 30.
[xii] Ibid. Chapter 4. 1262b17. Page 32.
[xiii]
Ibid. 1262b23.
[xiv] Ibid. Chapter 5. 1263a8-1263b2. pp
33-34.
[xv]
The Laws of Plato. Book 5. 744d. Page 132.
[xvi] Ibid.
[xvii]
Ibid. Book 9. 870a. Page 264.
[xviii]
Ibid. 869e.
[xix] Ibid. Book 1. 631c. Page 10.
[xx] Ibid. Book 5. 726-a-727a. Page 112.
[xxi]
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 5. Chapter 2. 1130b25. Page 94.
[xxii]
The Laws of Plato. Book 1. 631c-632c. pp 10-11.
[xxiii]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 2. Chapter 5. 1263b30-41. Page 35.
[xxiv]
The Laws of Plato. Book 4. 716e-717a. Page 103.
[xxv] Ibid. Book 4. 721b-721d. pp 108-109.
[xxvi]
Ibid. Book 7. 799a-799b. pp 187-188.
[xxvii]
Ibid. Book 8. 840d-842a. pp 232-233.
[xxviii]
Ibid. Book 10. 908b-909c. pp 308-309.
[xxix]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 5. Chapter 11. 1314b38-1315a5. Page 176.
[xxx]
The Laws of Plato. Book 1. 624a. Page 3.
[xxxi]
Ibid. Book 3. 681a-681d. pp 63-64.
[xxxii]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 1. Chapter 12. 1259b5-10. Pp 22-23.
[xxxiii]
Ibid.
[xxxiv]
The Laws of Plato. Book 5. 739c. Page 126.
[xxxv]
Ibid. Book 6. 785b. Page 174.
[xxxvi]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 5. Chapter 11. 1313b35. Page 174.
[xxxvii]
The Laws of Plato. Book 4. 712c-713a. Page 99.
[xxxviii]
Ibid. 709e-710a. Page 95.
[xxxix]
Ibid. 711c-711e. Page 97.
[xl] Ibid. 713b-713e. pp 99-100.
[xli] Ibid. 715d. Page 102.
[xlii]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 3. 1286b. Page 96.
[xliii]
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 8. Chapter 11. 1161a10-1161b10. pp180-181.
[xliv]
Aristotle’s Politics. Book 3. Chapter 1. Page 66.
[xlv] Ibid. Book 4. Chapter 4. 1292a. pp
112-113.
[xlvi]
Ibid. Chapter 9. 1294b15. Page 119.
[xlvii]
Ibid. Chapter 11. 1295b25-40. pp 122-123.
[xlviii]
Ibid. Book 3. Chapter 13. 1284a26-33.
Page 90.
[xlix]
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Book 1. Chapter 7. 1097b1. Page 11.
[l]
The Laws of Plato. Book 3. 681a-681d. pp 63-64.
